The following anecdote should only be read by people who aren't given to worry. It's not disturbing, and I'm perfectly fine, but I felt a warning was in order.
So, apparently watching Band of Brothers is kind of a risk here. The other night I was watching the D-Day episode, and there's some incoming, which I can kind of hear past the headphones... its kind of like wathcing the show with Surround Sound, but a little disturbing as you go "What was that?" Well, I relayed this story to my team leader, who said that the same thing happened to him in 2004 when he was here, watching Band of Brothers and listening to it in 3-D
Friday, March 21, 2008
Hmm..
Yeah, so I was completely off-base with my "conclusion." Dunlap's article is a lot more complex than I remember from ten years ago, before I had actually gotten into military theory, history, and COIN. So maybe this would be a better conclusion.
In fact, in re-reading the article, I realized there is a lot to wrap my head around, and I think it might actually serve as good of a discussion today as it did in 1992. Not that I think he's right on everything, there seems to be a very strong similarity between his statements and those of people like Gian Gentile who object to the focus on COIN in the Army. In fact, the conclusions Dunlap and Gentile both make about the focus on non-traditional maneuver combat in the Army are pretty much exactly the same. I think, though, that they miss a couple things. Unfortunately, I'm having a bit of a brain-fry at the moment, and I can't really think about this enough to express it well. Give me a few days, I'll have a better post.
In fact, in re-reading the article, I realized there is a lot to wrap my head around, and I think it might actually serve as good of a discussion today as it did in 1992. Not that I think he's right on everything, there seems to be a very strong similarity between his statements and those of people like Gian Gentile who object to the focus on COIN in the Army. In fact, the conclusions Dunlap and Gentile both make about the focus on non-traditional maneuver combat in the Army are pretty much exactly the same. I think, though, that they miss a couple things. Unfortunately, I'm having a bit of a brain-fry at the moment, and I can't really think about this enough to express it well. Give me a few days, I'll have a better post.
My Conspiracy Theory of the Day
So, take some of:
this
Add this and this
And you get something which looks disturbingly like this minus the crazy military leader. But you know, when you have this, and this you probably don’t need the crazy military leader, as the military will just sit back and let it happen since it can’t do anything about it. And frankly, considering the existence of Northcom and the legal problems it might raise, it might even feel obligated to help out.
Incidentally, the pharmaceuticals in the water concern has been around a lot longer than the past two weeks, I found this 2000 article.
this
Add this and this
And you get something which looks disturbingly like this minus the crazy military leader. But you know, when you have this, and this you probably don’t need the crazy military leader, as the military will just sit back and let it happen since it can’t do anything about it. And frankly, considering the existence of Northcom and the legal problems it might raise, it might even feel obligated to help out.
Incidentally, the pharmaceuticals in the water concern has been around a lot longer than the past two weeks, I found this 2000 article.
Wednesday, March 19, 2008
Equilibrium
I am simply happy to report that I realized this morning, after a gruff request from my roommate, that I annoy him with my sleeping through my alarm as much as he annoys me with his constant need to have the air conditioning on (even when it is 50 degrees outside). All is right with the world.
Tuesday, March 18, 2008
Another Boyd inspired thought
The institution which is the US Army is generally considered monolithic and hidebound. I tend to agree with that, and in reading Swift Elusive Sword, I started thinking about the force structure here. Boyd's main contribution to warfare was the invention of the OODA loop, and the successful commander is the one who manages to "get inside" his opponents OODA loop. Large, technologically constrained organizations will tend to lose engagements because the OODA loop of such organizations is too long, and the enemy can quickly respond and re-maneuver to take advantage of hesitations in the opponent. Now, by technologically constrained I do not mean ones without technology. In fact, it is typically the opposite which holds true. The more technology a force has, the more it is constrained by that same technology. One of the oft repeated mantras of the COIN disciples is "infantry, infantry, infantry." Computers, updates, reports, etc., will actually constrain a force from responding quickly.
The best officer I ever served under called all of the NCOs in a room before our deployment and told us "I will always explain the orders I give, and why I am giving them, and I expect you to do the same with your men." The counterpart to this, of course, is that sometimes orders will be given without time for explanation, but having known that there was a reason before, you will know that there is a reason for the quick orders, too. However, the unspoken element of this is directly applicable to COIN. By knowing the purpose underlying the orders being given, all of us NCOs, and our soldiers, were aware of the overall intent of the commander, and thus we were able to take our own initiative to solve problems and respond to situations without having to ask for orders at each point. Although this is generally an element of US Army doctrine, I have known many commanders who simply put out orders without explanation, leaving the lower officers and NCOs to attempt to interpret and request guidance in unfamiliar situations. This adds to the time it takes that lower officer to complete his OODA loop.
Another problem is the transmission of information inherent in the typical Army battalion/brigade. As it was put by one soldier here: "information goes up the chain, it never comes back down." We have our S2 (intelligence) units compiling information and reports collected from lower levels, and then maybe providing reports to the battalion/brigade commanders, who use that information to design missions. Well, if you really want to minimize friction, speed up your OODA loop, and run an efficiant organization, those reports need to be distributed down to the very bottom level. I remember a number of stories from fellow soldiers who had just gotten back from Afghanistan where they had gone to a village, spoken with people, and only months later found out that they had been having dinner with a high value target. I'm sure it happens in Iraq, too. I think it actually happened with our team a few times.
Now, this all gets to a point which I had intended to start with, but luckily this isn't an academic paper, its just a blog: our current force structure in Iraq is still based on a maneuver warfare, big Army war. We have slowly shifted to COIN, which is a good thing, but we are still organizing our units in traditional ways. We have individual brigades, who are given an area. Then each battalion is given an area, then each company in the battalion is given a smaller area. Sounds all well and good, except that you have Armor battalions, infantry battalions, Engineer battalions, light infantry, heavy infantry, mechanized infantry, etc. I can't tell you how many tankers I've met who complain that they have to go out on foot patrols and fight as infantry, when all they want to do is ride in their Abrams/Bradleys and lay down fire. Now - even though we are much "lighter" in a COIN fight, I think there is still a place for seriously heavy firepower.
Now, each brigade tends to be a combined arms organization. Some light forces, some heavy forces, some armor, etc. But why do we stick this at the Battalion level? This is left over, as near as I can tell, from the days of Mass Warfare, large squares of infantry arrayed against others, and the chess moves of trying to outmaneuver the opponent so that you're heavy infantry hits his light infantry, you're cavalry hits his heavy infantry, etc. And you did this on a large scale. But here, in Iraq, with an enemy which shifts as quickly as the stock market, none of that paradigm holds true. We need to completely break away from the battalion/brigade focused doctrine we currently have.
Abu Muqawama has a blog entry that touches on this, in terms of brigades as advisor teams. And a wonderful analogy with ice cream. To continue the analogy, I would say that if a "scoop" represents a battalion, we need to move away from a Baskin Robbins paradigm and into a Cold Stone Creamery paradigm. We need to mix up our "scoops" at the very basic level - since we know that its the soldiers who are on the streets that will win the COIN fight, those soldiers are the level at which the combined arms approach needs to be addressed. A platoon of light infantry, a platoon of heavier infantry (Bradleys/Strykers), and an assortment of other elements (engineers, MPs, etc.) Since COIN is so often modeled off of SF, look at how a SF team is organized: one/two people have specific areas of expertise, rather than having a "weapons team" and a "commo team" or some other unresponsive system. We should be doing the same for our maneuver units.
The best officer I ever served under called all of the NCOs in a room before our deployment and told us "I will always explain the orders I give, and why I am giving them, and I expect you to do the same with your men." The counterpart to this, of course, is that sometimes orders will be given without time for explanation, but having known that there was a reason before, you will know that there is a reason for the quick orders, too. However, the unspoken element of this is directly applicable to COIN. By knowing the purpose underlying the orders being given, all of us NCOs, and our soldiers, were aware of the overall intent of the commander, and thus we were able to take our own initiative to solve problems and respond to situations without having to ask for orders at each point. Although this is generally an element of US Army doctrine, I have known many commanders who simply put out orders without explanation, leaving the lower officers and NCOs to attempt to interpret and request guidance in unfamiliar situations. This adds to the time it takes that lower officer to complete his OODA loop.
Another problem is the transmission of information inherent in the typical Army battalion/brigade. As it was put by one soldier here: "information goes up the chain, it never comes back down." We have our S2 (intelligence) units compiling information and reports collected from lower levels, and then maybe providing reports to the battalion/brigade commanders, who use that information to design missions. Well, if you really want to minimize friction, speed up your OODA loop, and run an efficiant organization, those reports need to be distributed down to the very bottom level. I remember a number of stories from fellow soldiers who had just gotten back from Afghanistan where they had gone to a village, spoken with people, and only months later found out that they had been having dinner with a high value target. I'm sure it happens in Iraq, too. I think it actually happened with our team a few times.
Now, this all gets to a point which I had intended to start with, but luckily this isn't an academic paper, its just a blog: our current force structure in Iraq is still based on a maneuver warfare, big Army war. We have slowly shifted to COIN, which is a good thing, but we are still organizing our units in traditional ways. We have individual brigades, who are given an area. Then each battalion is given an area, then each company in the battalion is given a smaller area. Sounds all well and good, except that you have Armor battalions, infantry battalions, Engineer battalions, light infantry, heavy infantry, mechanized infantry, etc. I can't tell you how many tankers I've met who complain that they have to go out on foot patrols and fight as infantry, when all they want to do is ride in their Abrams/Bradleys and lay down fire. Now - even though we are much "lighter" in a COIN fight, I think there is still a place for seriously heavy firepower.
Now, each brigade tends to be a combined arms organization. Some light forces, some heavy forces, some armor, etc. But why do we stick this at the Battalion level? This is left over, as near as I can tell, from the days of Mass Warfare, large squares of infantry arrayed against others, and the chess moves of trying to outmaneuver the opponent so that you're heavy infantry hits his light infantry, you're cavalry hits his heavy infantry, etc. And you did this on a large scale. But here, in Iraq, with an enemy which shifts as quickly as the stock market, none of that paradigm holds true. We need to completely break away from the battalion/brigade focused doctrine we currently have.
Abu Muqawama has a blog entry that touches on this, in terms of brigades as advisor teams. And a wonderful analogy with ice cream. To continue the analogy, I would say that if a "scoop" represents a battalion, we need to move away from a Baskin Robbins paradigm and into a Cold Stone Creamery paradigm. We need to mix up our "scoops" at the very basic level - since we know that its the soldiers who are on the streets that will win the COIN fight, those soldiers are the level at which the combined arms approach needs to be addressed. A platoon of light infantry, a platoon of heavier infantry (Bradleys/Strykers), and an assortment of other elements (engineers, MPs, etc.) Since COIN is so often modeled off of SF, look at how a SF team is organized: one/two people have specific areas of expertise, rather than having a "weapons team" and a "commo team" or some other unresponsive system. We should be doing the same for our maneuver units.
Monday, March 17, 2008
Another Stars and Stripes Story
So, I guess its the day for Stars and Stripes to piss me off. Well, not the paper, but the stories in it.
Apparently, we're upset that China is spending so much money on its military.
Well, a quick run of the numbers: China has a 2.68 trillion GDP, and spent 59 billion on defense.
The United States has a GDP of 130 trillion, and spent 419 on defense.
This means that 3% of our GDP is spent on defense, while 2% of China's GDP is spent on defense.
Also, direct from the White House website: "The 2006 request represents a 41-percent increase over 2001, and a 4.8-percent increase over 2005" Now - I call your attention to the "41% increase" - because apparently we're getting bent out of shape over China's 18% increase...
Also, China has been reporting a boom in its economy, and an increase in the GDP for the past few years, while the US... not so much
(I admit, I looked for an article on the bad economy)
Apparently, we're upset that China is spending so much money on its military.
Well, a quick run of the numbers: China has a 2.68 trillion GDP, and spent 59 billion on defense.
The United States has a GDP of 130 trillion, and spent 419 on defense.
This means that 3% of our GDP is spent on defense, while 2% of China's GDP is spent on defense.
Also, direct from the White House website: "The 2006 request represents a 41-percent increase over 2001, and a 4.8-percent increase over 2005" Now - I call your attention to the "41% increase" - because apparently we're getting bent out of shape over China's 18% increase...
Also, China has been reporting a boom in its economy, and an increase in the GDP for the past few years, while the US... not so much
(I admit, I looked for an article on the bad economy)
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